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REFUGE OF A ROGUE
By WM.

HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.,

RUNO RICHARD HAUPTMANN

of the Denver Bar.
staked his life and his

freedom on three alibis, and lost.
The first official notice that Hauptmann was to rely
on alibis for his defense came when Mr. Fisher, one of his
counsel, said at the opening of the defense testimony: "We
submit that in our defense we will attempt, and we believe
successfully, to prove to you a complete alibi for the defendant
Hauptmann on each and every occasion that he has been
named as being present at a given point."
Until Hauptmann took the stand, the prosecution had no
idea what those alibis would be; and until the witnesses to
those alibis had testified, the attorney-general and his staff
had no knowledge who would testify, nor to what. This
lack of knowledge was a tremendous handicap, for the prosecution had little or no time to check the history-and character
of these witnesses nor to investigate the accuracy of the alibis.
One of the favorite defenses of the criminal is an alibi.
It is usually introduced as the last bit of testimony in the defendant's case. It is almost impossible for a prosecutor to
meet this evidence because he is totally unaware of what is
coming, of what stories he must be able to refute.
In the Hauptmann case, for example, over a dozen people
paraded to the witness chair in the closing days of the trial
to establish the three alibis Hauptmann had set up. He swore
that on the evening of the kidnapping he was in Christian
Fredricksen's bakery until nine o'clock waiting for his wife,
and that thereafter he went home, not to leave the house
again that night. He swore that on the evening the ransom
money was paid in the cemetery, he was spending a "moosical" evening at home with friends. He swore that when the
ransom bills were passed in November, 1932, he was many
miles from the place where the bills were circulated.
In addition to his wife's testimony attempting to establish these alibis, about a dozen other witnesses tried to build
up these stories. Fortunately, David Wilentz and his staff
were able to show the jury that many of the defense witnesses
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were convicted criminals, dope fiends, and psychopathics, and
that there was little possibility of any truth in their narratives.
The evidence that was secured concerning these witnesses
had to be secured quickly, and undoubtedly much more could
have been disclosed if Mr. Wilentz had had time to prepare
it. But more frequently the prosecutor has neither the resources nor even a short time to check both the alibi witness
and his story. He must meet this defense instantly in the
middle of a trial, without any preparation whatsoever. In
such a case there is frequently a gross miscarriage of justice.
Another criminal is turned loose to garrote society.
Fortunately, there has been a recent tendency to protect
society against the criminal instead of placing all the odds in
favor of the criminal. Heretofore most all of the protection
has been placed about the criminal, while society stands bare
and defenseless. Before a case goes to trial, for example, the
state is compelled by law to allege specifically the offense and
to furnish the defendant with the names of his witnesses. The
defendant simply pleads guilty or not guilty. He does not
even suggest the nature of his defense nor who his witnesses
may be. The defense attorneys have a good opportunity to
check the state's allegations and its witnesses from every angle.
On the other hand, the state must be prepared to meet
the unknown, both as to the nature of the defense and as to
the antecedents, character, and reliability of its supporting
witnesses. Obviously, this is an impossible task for any prosecutor. The result is that many a criminal comes to court with
perjured alibi testimony and escapes the law.
To overcome this difficulty, a law was enacted in Michigan
in 1927 which provided that not less than four days before
the trial the defendant should serve upon the prosecuting
attorney a notice of the intention to claim an alibi, setting
forth specific information as to the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense. Ohio
enacted a similar law in 1929, and Wisconsin followed in
1934.
The soundness of this law was recognized by the American Bar Associaticm, which in its annual meeting in 1934
approved the principle. Since that date the Association has
continually urged states to enact similar laws. Under the
direction of the Association, some 150 local bar associations
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are studying this measure, as well as other reforms in criminal
law, and have caused its introduction into 18 legislatures in
the 1935 session. At least 8 states and the federal government
have recently added this act to their statutes.
The advantage of this law is apparent. State and defendant are placed upon equal footing. There is no longer a sudden popping up of witnesses to swear the defendant out of
his troubles. There is a noticeable reduction in perjury.
Michigan and Ohio should by this time have been a good
proving ground. How has the alibi defense law worked in
practice there? In Detroit since the passage of the act alibi
defenses are very few. A good percentage of those offered
have been proved false and convictions have followed. Police
and prosecuting officials state that the great increase in convictions where alibis have been offered since the passage of the
act is due to the opportunity they have to inquire into the
facts of the alleged alibi and to refute and destroy those which
are false.
Ohio reports nearly the same experience. Shortly after
the new law became effective, the number of alibi defenses
offered decreased very noticeably; and in a short time were
being used only in a minimum number of cases.
The effectiveness of the alibi defense law is thus demonstrated by actual practice. It means that wherever the law
is in force, there is no longer a sudden flood of unknown witnesses to testify that the accused was not at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission and thus throw a reasonable doubt on the testimony of state witnesses. Criminals,
as well as their lawyers, in these three states are impressed by
the fact that an alibi defense refuted in open court is worse
than no defense at all.
In those states where there is no alibi defense law, witnesses continue to appear with startling suddenness at the
close of a trial. Any volume of law reports will disclose some
of these interesting and ingenious alibi defenses which are
without warning sprung on the prosecution.
For example, in a recent case a defendant was charged
with burglarizing a freight depot at Celeste, Texas, and taking some shoes and pocket knives. Soon after the burglary
the defendant was found selling these goods. On the last day
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of the trial the defendant pleaded that he won the shoes and
pocket knives in a game of chance in a filling station in
Leonard, Texas, and had witnesses to prove it. A judge
reviewing the case observed with caustic emphasis that the
defendant, though he had frequent opportunities to do so,
said nothing about the alibi until the last day of the trial.
The most frequent of the alibi defenses, however, is the
somewhere else" plea. To establish his innocence, a defendant will offer evidence that he was somewhere else than the
scene of the crime and will offer testimony of his wife, "Moll,"
relatives or friends to prove it.
A typical instance of such a defense is a recent Missouri
case. The teller of a bank which had been robbed identified
the defendants as the hold-up men. The defendants each had
an alibi. One said he had stayed at his father's home, then
had visited his brother, and the day after the crime had left
for New Orleans. Of course, the family all concurred in this
alibi. The second defendant established his alibi by one of
his relatives who testified that defendant had stayed at his
home continuously a day before and until two days after the
robbery, and then had departed for Cleveland. The relative
brought a postal card purportedly sent by the accused several
days later from Cleveland.
The postal card is a favorite trick of criminals. Gang
members can easily mail cards from any desired city, thereby making possible an alibi. In fact, there is one legitimate
firm that will guarantee to mail letters for one from every
part of the world. It is a very simple trick, but may be effective with a jury by casting a reasonable doubt into their
minds. Along with such alibis goes the forged hotel register,
the faked photograph, and other similar manufactured evidence.
Manufactured alibis have offered one of the simplest and
easiest avenues of escape for the criminal. Besides escape,
it has encouraged perjury and thereby added a considerable
item to unpunished crime.
The days when men went about the English halls of
justice with straws in their sandals indicating their willingness to testify to anything for a fee, are not so far removed
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from the present. Criminals may not expose the straws in
their shoes, but their footwear is pretty well lined with straw.
It is estimated that perjured testimony occurs in about
75% to 90% of the criminal cases. Yet only .009 of the
criminal cases in New York in one year were for perjury, and
the percentage seems to follow throughout the country. The
reasons why perjury is so infrequently punished are the technicalities of the law, the hesitancy on the part of judges to
commit witnesses suspected of perjury, the apathy of prosecuting attorneys, the refusal of grand juries to indict and
petit juries to convict, and the severe but ineffective punishment provided by law.
In the Hauptmann case, a goodly percentage of the testimony attempting to establish the alibis was undoubtedly
perjured. Prosecutions of four witnesses offering perjured
testimony are planned.
A recent Virginia case indicates the manner in which much
alibi testimony is manufactured. A certain Mrs. Mundy had
been indicted for selling liquor at a tearoom which she managed. The state claimed that two prohibition officers purchased drinks from her at eight o'clock on the evening of
December 10, 1931. Her alibi was that on that night at
seven-thirty she left her car to be repaired in a garage at Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and that the repairs were not
completed until nine o'clock. The garage man produced
memo charges and book entries to bolster the alibi, and Mrs.
Mundy was acquited.
Unfortunately for Mrs. Mundy, however, the presiding
judge believed the testimony was perjured and he ordered that
she be tried for offering false testimony. On the perjury trial,
it developed that the supposed garage man did not own a
garage and had never repaired her car. As a matter of fact, he
was unemployed and had testified along the lines suggested by
Mrs. Mundy, who had caused the necessary books to be prepared. Needless to say, Mrs. Mundy was convicted of perjury.
This example is not an uncommon one. The only thing
uncommon about the Mundy trial was that she was convicted
of perjury. Faked alibis are offered every day in court.
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Judge Wilkerson of the Federal District Court in Chicago
made this striking statement in the D'Andrea contempt of
court case: (D'Andrea, you may remember, was Capone's
bodyguard.)
"From that camp (Capone's), under what coercive influences we can only conjecture from what transpired in court,
came that array of shocking perjury with which the court was
confronted during the closing days of trial. We had here the
spectacle of (alibi) witness after witness testifying in a way
which was psychologically impossible, pretending to remember things which in the very nature of the human mind the
witness could not have remembered if he had forgotten the
things which he pretended to have forgotten. It was perjury
on the face of it."
What took place in Judge Wilkerson's court that day
occurs in practically every court of the land, especially where
the defendant is permitted unlimited heights to concoct an
alibi. This "array of shocking perjury" can be eliminated
to a large extent by the alibi defense law which the American
Bar Association and the Association of Grand Jurors of New
York County are urging the various states to enact into law.
Mr. Wilentz, who is a firm believer of the advance notice
of alibi law, is frequently asked why he did not invoke the
recent New Jersey alibi defense law in the Hauptmann trial.
In so important a case as that one he did not dare to inject
constitutional questions into the case at the cost of the taxpayer. The law had never been tested in the New Jersey
courts, although it has been approved in both Michigan and
Ohio. Secondly, the New Jersey law does not follow the
terms of the usual alibi defense law, and its usefulness has to
a large measure been nullified by an unusual provision which
gives the defendant a chance to offer additional rebuttal witnesses (should the alibi be perjured) to counteract any investigation the state may undertake.
The alibi defense law is not proposed as a panacea for
all the ills of criminal law. It has two obvious merits: It
permits the state to be as well prepared as the defense, and
it tends in a large measure to eliminate perjury. It is an aid
in promoting the ends of justice, and as one writer has recently said, it is "indicative of the manner in which revision
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and modernization of archaic codes of criminal procedure
may serve to make the criminal law what it is intended to be,
'A sword for the guilty and a shield for the innocent'." To
anyone familiar with criminal procedure, there comes the
realization that our past tendency has been to safeguard the
criminal against society by placing all sorts of technicalities
and obstructions in his hands. It is high time that we now
safeguard society against the criminal, and give both society
and the accused an even break.
NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN
By HON.

FOSTER CLINE,

of S. E. C.

Since I am no longer in general practice and very seldom
file pleadings of any kind in the courts, it may be safe for me
to submit for your consideration as an interesting article for
DICTA the following quotations from a decision in 1568
concerning, the great length of pleadings, in which the Chancellor observed:
"that the said replication (i. e., the pleading) doth amount to six score
sheets of paper and yet all the matter thereof which is pertinent might
have been well contrived in sixteen sheets of paper

and gave order
"that the Warden of the Fleet shall take the said Richard Mylward (the
culprit pleader) alias Alexander into his custody and shall bring him
into Westminster Hall on Saturday next about 10 of the clock in the
forenoon and then and there shall cut a hole in the midst of the same
engrossed Replication which is delivered unto him for that purpose, and
put the said Richard's head through the same hole, and so let the same
Replication hang about his shoulders with the written side hanging outward, and then, the same so hanging, shall lead the said Richard bareheaded and barefaced round about Westminster Hall whilst the Courts
are sitting, and shall show him at the Bar of every of the three Courts
within the Hall, and then shall take him back again to the Fleet, and
keep him prisoner until he shall have paid lb 10 to her Majesty for a
fine and 20 nobles to the defendant for his costs in respect of the aforesaid abuse."
"All we know of freedom, all we use or know
This our fathers bought for us long and long ago;
Ancient right, unnoticed as the breath we draw
Leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law;
Lance, and torch, and tumult, steel and gray, goose wing
Wrenched them inch, and ell, and all, slowly from the King."

